The consequences of the theorems about ontological models are studied. Maximally ψ-epistemic is shown to be equivalent to the conjunction of two other conditions, each of which can be realized in Hilbert spaces of arbitrary dimension, but which cannot occur together for d > 2. I argue that current theorems do not invalidate an epistemic interpretation of quantum states. A new condition, called functionally ψ-epistemic, is introduced, which, were it to be excluded, would signal the exclusion of epistemic interpretations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Debates over the status of the quantum state concept have been ongoing since the beginning of the theory. Is the state ψ a physically real object (ontic interpretation), or is it an abstract entity that merely provides information about the system (epistemic interpretation)? The introduction of ontological models by Harrigan and Spekkens [1] created a framework whereby the discussion could be made much more precise. Now the arguments are based on mathematically proven theorems, in addition to philosophical arguments. But the growing number of theorems, combined with some peculiar terminology, has led to confusion. We read of maximally ψ-epistemic models [2] [3] , and maximally nontrivial ψ-epistemic models [4] . The two terms are not synonymous; moreover, the authors of the first prove the nonexistence of that class of models, whereas the authors of the second provide constructive examples of their class. Several other classes of ontological models have been discussed, many of which have constructive (though often artificial) examples. If this was not already complicated enough, it has been claimed to prove [7] that the only mathematically consistent interpretation is that the wave function of a system be in one-to-one correspondence with its elements of reality. Yet the observational inadequacy of that interpretation was already well known to Einstein and Schrödinger in 1935, since in that interpretation, Schrödinger's cat would have neither the property of being live nor being dead. Taken together, all of these claims seem to indicate that no satisfactory interpretation of quantum theory is even possible! "A good joke should not be repeated too often," as Einstein said to Heisenberg. In this paper I shall try to overcome the confusion that may come from a casual reading of the recent literature, with its apparently conflicting claims. I shall limit myself to ontological models of single component systems, and so will not treat Bell's theorem, nonlocality, or entanglement. Those topics have their own extensive literature, and including them would make for much too long a paper. * ballenti@sfu.ca
II. ONTOLOGICAL MODELS
In an ontological model, we posit a space Λ of ontic states, which underlie or supplement the quantum state ψ. The two primary quantum-mechanical concepts of state preparation and measurement are each represented in an ontological model. A preparation S P of the quantum state ψ actually yields some ontic state λ ∈ Λ. A repetition of the same S P may yield a different λ, and the probability distribution of the resulting ontic states, µ(λ|ψ, S P ), is called the epistemic state associated with ψ. It satisfies Λ µ(λ|ψ, S P )dλ = 1 .
(
The possible outcomes of a measurement of the observable M may be labeled by its eigenvalues, or (as is more convenient here) by its eigenvectors {φ k }. The probability of obtaining the k'th outcome is given by the response function, ξ(φ k |λ, S M ), where S M denotes the particular measurement method used. If ξ takes on only the values 0 or 1, the model is called outcome-deterministic. If ξ may take on values between 0 and 1, the model is called outcome-indeterministic. There may be more than one preparation method, S P , that yields the same quantum state. If the epistemic state µ(λ|ψ, S P ) depends nontrivially on S P for the same ψ, the model is called preparation contextual. Similarly, there may be more than one way to measure M . If the response function ξ(φ k |λ, S M ) depends nontrivially on the method S M , the model is called measurement contextual. When contextuality is not relevant, the notations S P and S M may be omitted for brevity.
The model is required to reproduce the quantum statistics for measurement outcomes. Without serious loss of generality, we may consider only a projective observable, M = |φ φ|. Then if the quantum state ψ is prepared, the probability of a positive outcome of the measurement will be
Quantum mechanics has an interesting reciprocal relation between state preparation and measurement. Quantum Certainty: A system that is prepared in the state ψ will always pass the test of measuring the projector |ψ ψ|. Converse: The state ψ is the only state that will pass the projective measurement filter |ψ ψ| with certainty. Since both Quantum Certainty and its converse hold in quantum mechanics, there is a relationship of preparation-measurement reciprocity, which will be called reciprocity, for short.
An ontological model must satisfy Quantum Certainty, otherwise it would not agree with a prediction of quantum mechanics. Hence we must require
The supports, in the ontic state space Λ, of the two functions in the integrand above, are of considerable interest. Define Λ ψ = Supp(µ(λ|ψ)) as the subset of Λ for which µ(λ|ψ) > 0. Similarly, Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)) is the subset of Λ within which ξ(ψ|λ) is nonzero. We also define the core support of the response function, Core(ξ(ψ|λ)), as the subset of Λ within which ξ(ψ|λ) = 1. The relation between Core and Supp is illustrated in Figure 1 . Notice that the range of integration in (3) may be reduced from Λ to the subset Λ ψ , since only there is the integrand nonzero. But since µ(λ|ψ) is non-negative and satisfies (1), the requirement (3) can be satisfied only if ξ(ψ|λ) = 1 for all λ inside Λ ψ . Hence we conclude that
This relation is very useful in clarifying several properties of ontological models. The first inclusion ensures that any ontic state that may be produced by a preparation of ψ will also pass the projective filter |ψ ψ|, so the model satisfies Quantum Certainty. But the converse need not hold. It is possible for the set of ontic states that pass the filter |ψ ψ| with certainty to be larger than the set Λ ψ that can be prepared with the quantum state ψ. Thus reciprocity does not hold for all ontic models. The condition for reciprocity is
An outcome-deterministic model satisfies
whereas an outcome-indeterministic model satisfies
The inelegant term deficiency has been used [5] for the relation Λ ψ ⊂ Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)). It is apparent from (4) that deficiency may alternatively be defined as Deficiency = nonreciprocity OR outcome-indeterminacy (8)
III. ψ-EPISTEMIC MODELS, MAXIMAL AND OTHERWISE
Harrigan and Spekkens [1] define two principal classes of ontological models: ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic. Intuitively speaking, ψ-ontic means that the quantum state ψ is an element of physical reality, whereas ψ-epistemic means that ψ is an abstract entity that provides information about the system. These intuitive notions are supplemented by a more precise mathematical definition. A model is considered to be ψ-ontic if the specification of the ontic state λ uniquely determines the quantum state ψ. For this to be true, it is necessary that the preparations of any pair of different quantum states, ψ and φ, should yield ontic state distributions whose supports, Λ ψ and Λ φ , do not overlap. Two subclasses are identified. In a ψ-complete model, ψ is the only ontic state variable. In a ψ-supplemented model, there are some other ontic variables in addition to ψ. (One could identify a third class, in which specifying the ontic variable(s) λ, excluding ψ, enables ψ to be uniquely calculated. But since no such models have yet been constructed, the point is moot.)
Although the class ψ-ontic was carefully defined, the class ψ-epistemic was merely defined as the complement of ψ-ontic. This allows trivial ψ-epistemic models, such as ones for which there is only a single pair of states, ψ and φ, for which Λ ψ and Λ φ overlap. However, there are nontrivial ψ-epistemic models. Indeed, Aaronson et al. [4] have shown that there are maximally-nontrivial ψ-epistemic models, for which the supports Λ ψ and Λ φ overlap for every non-orthogonal pair, ψ and φ. These models can be constructed for any finite dimension of the Hilbert space.
Following this line, the most ambitious goal would be to construct maximally-epistemic models, for which the overlap probability of any two state vectors, | φ|ψ | 2 , is fully accounted for by the overlap of the corresponding distributions, µ(λ|φ) and µ(λ|ψ). A way to implement this condition would be to require that all of the contributions to the integral on the left side of (2) should come from the overlap region Λ φ ∩Λ ψ . We have the elementary
(Note: The first line uses Λ φ ⊆ Core(ξ(φ|λ)) from (4) , and the integrals are effectively over Λ φ ∩ Λ ψ .) A maximally-epistemic model is defined to satisfy the above relations with the inequality replaced by an equality. If we write
where 0 ≤ f (φ, ψ) ≤ 1, then the condition for a model to be maximally-epistemic is f (φ, ψ) = 1 for all φ and ψ.
The Kochen-Specker model for a spin-1 2 system is a nice example of a maximally ψ-epistemic model. (The original K-S paper predates the framework of ontological models, but both [1] and [5] give concise descriptions of the K-S model within this framework.) However, Maroney [2] has demonstrated that in Hilbert spaces of 3 or more dimensions, it is impossible to have f (φ, ψ) = 1 for all vectors. If f is taken to be a constant, he obtains the bound f ≤ 9 10 for 3 dimensions. Much tighter bounds have been obtained for higher Hilbert-space dimensions [2] [6] . Therefore, maximally ψ-epistemic models do not exist for more than 2 dimensions.
Maroney's theorem [2] is surprising, and we should try to better understand its significance. To reproduce the statistical predictions of QM, any model must satisfy
A maximally ψ-epistemic model must also satisfy
These equations must both hold for all choices of |ψ . We may assume that any λ ∈ Λ can be reached by a preparation of some |ψ (else the unpreparable values of λ would be superfluous, and could be discarded from the model). Therefore, it is necessary that ξ(φ|λ) = 1 for λ ∈ Λ φ , and that ξ(φ|λ) = 0 for λ outside of Λ φ . Hence
This equation says that a maximally ψ-epistemic model must satisfy reciprocity and outcome-determinacy. Because it will be useful in the next section, I state a Corollary of (13):
Suppose that ξ(φ|λ, S M ) were to depend nontrivially on the measurement procedure S M . We have already shown that ξ(φ|λ) = 1 for λ ∈ Λ φ , and is zero elsewhere. Since Λ φ is fixed by the state preparation, it cannot depend on S M , so there is no way that ξ(φ|λ, S M ) can acquire dependence on S M . Thus ξ(φ|λ) is actually noncontextual.
Returning to the main argument, the converse of (13) is also true. This can be seen by following the steps backwards to (11) . Therefore, we have a new characterization of maximally ψ-epistemic models:
Maximally ψ-epistemic ⇐⇒ Reciprocity AND Outcome-determinacy (14)
It follows from this implication that any ontological model (ψ-ontic included) can fail to be maximally ψ-epistemic in only two ways. It can be outcomeindeterminate, or it can fail to be reciprocal (the latter implying that the converse of Quantum Certainty does not hold for the model). In view of Maroney's theorem, every ontological model (except for those that treat only 2-d Hilbert spaces) must be either outcomeindeterminate or nonreciprocal.
In view of the failure of the attempt to explain the indistinguishability of non-orthogonal quantum states by the overlap of the corresponding ontic state probability distributions, we should ask how it is explained within the above two options. If the model is outcomeindeterminate then the explanation is qualitatively the same as for ordinary QM without any deeper layer of ontic states. It is not the case that non-orthogonal quantum states cannot be distinguished -it is only that they cannot be distinguished with certainty. It is a standard problem of quantum information theory to devise an optimal measurement for distinguishing non-orthogonal states. As the two states approach orthogonality, the success rate approaches 100%, and as they approach parallelism the success rate approaches that of pure chance (50%). But in all cases, the optimal strategy is better than pure chance. If the ontic states of the model are accessible, then the predictive power of the model may be greater than that of pure QM. But there will be no qualitative difference.
The next case appears to be quite different. In the previous case (outcome-indeterminate) we have
while in this case (nonreciprocal ), we have
Yet there is a similarity, in that both cases obey
This property that has been burdened [5] with the undescriptive name deficiency. But since non-deficiency is equivalent to maximally ψ-epistemic, perhaps the ugly word deficiency can be laid to rest. Far from being a defect of ontological models, it is actually an aspect of quantum normality. Example 1 in App. A (the Beltrametti-Bugajski model) is essentially ordinary QM, without any additional ontic structures, and it exhibits property (17). This section began with a discovery -the impossibility of maximally ψ-epistemic models in dimensions greater than 2 -that appeared to pose a serious threat to epistemic interpretations of quantum states. It has concluded by showing that the impossibility of such models is equivalent to two structural features that affect all ontological models, both ψ-epistemic and ψ-ontic. So, thus far, both epistemic and ontic interpretations remain viable.
IV. CONTEXTUALITY
The various concepts of contextuality have been studied in detail by Harrigan and Rudolph [5] and by Leifer and Maroney [3] . The latter paper contains the theorem:
Both implications are strictly one-directional. I shall discuss separately the significance of the two parts of this theorem (for proofs, see [3] ).
A. Preparation Contextuality
Let µ(λ|ρ, S P ) be the probability of obtaining the ontic state λ from a preparation of the (pure or mixed) quantum state ρ by the method S P . If this probability depends nontrivially on the preparation method S P for the same quantum state ρ, this situation is called preparation contextuality. Although this concept could, in principle, be applied to pure states, in practice, it has only been used for states that are (literally) mixtures.
It is well known that a mixed state operator can be represented as convex sum of pure components in many ways. For example, the unpolarized state of an ensemble of spin-1 2 particles can be obtained from the following two mixtures:
The first equation describes a mixture of eigenstates of spin σ z (up and down), while the second describes a mixture of eigenstates of spin σ x (left and right ). The state operator ρ 0 is the same in both cases. But are the distributions of ontic states {λ} the same in both cases? For the Kochen-Specker model (Ex. 2 in App. A), they are not. The state operator ρ 0 has spherical symmetry, but in the first case, the ontic state distribution has cylindrical symmetry about the z-axis, while in the second case it has cylindrical symmetry about the x-axis.
As was shown in the previous section, maximal ψ-epistemic fails in most cases, therefore, from (18), preparation noncontextuality must also fail in those cases. In other words, the ontic state distribution µ(λ|ρ, S P ) typically depends, not only on the quantum state ρ, but also on the particular mixture used to prepare it.
Should this fact be of concern to the supporters of any particular interpretation of QM? I think not. It is quite common, in both classical and quantum physics, for a higher level theory to be more symmetric than the lower level theory that underlies it. Consider the continuum theory of electrical conductivity, which is described by the conductivity tensor σ µν . Beneath it lies the atomic theory, in which electrons flow through a crystal lattice. The crystal lattice is never isotropic, but if it possesses 4-fold symmetry, then it is easy to show that this implies an isotropic conductivity tensor, σ µν = σ 0 δ µν . This situation -that the higher level theory is more symmetric than the lower level theory beneath it -is typical. It is not at all surprising that a similar relation should hold between quantum theory and the ontological models.
B. Kochen-Specker Theorem
The theorem of Kochen and Specker [9] addresses the question:
Is it possible that, at any instant of time, the QM observables each possess a definite value (equal to one of its eigenvalues), regardless of whether they have been measured?
The system that they consider is quite realistic: a particle of spin 1, and its dynamical variables S The KS problem is to construct a valuation on the set {M i }, which must satisfy the following conditions. (i) For each vector direction, the value is either 0 or 1.
(ii) For any orthogonal triad of vectors, exactly one of them has the value 1.
(iii) No two orthogonal vectors can both receive the value 1.
Difficulties arise because a vector can belong to more than one triad. By a heroic effort, Kochen and Specker were able to construct a graph of 117 vectors, for which they proved that no such valuation is possible! Remark 1: The KS theorem is the impossibility of the valuation described above. There is no mention of measurement, and in view of the question posed at the beginning, there should be none.
There is more than one possible interpretation as to the physical reason behind the KS theorem.
(PI 1) The set of observables used in the KS theorem do not have predetermined values. Rather, the values emerge as a consequence of the interaction between the system and the measurement apparatus.
(PI 2) The outcomes of the measurements are contextual. For example, a measurement of the commuting triple (M x , M y , M z ) is one possible context for measurement of M x . A measurement of (M x , M y ′ , M z ′ ) is another context. Here (y ′ , z ′ ) are obtained from (y, z) by rotation about the x-axis. If the measurements are contextual, the values obtained for M x may be different in these two contexts.
Abbott et al. [10] show that propositions PI 1 and PI 2 are not equivalent. Each is sufficient to "explain" the KS theorem, but neither is necessary. Note that the KS theorem does not say that every observable must be value indefinite or contextual, but only that it is impossible for the entire set of observables to be value definite and noncontextual. Abbott et al. show that, for any chosen set of observables, it is possible for at least one to be value definite. An interesting goal of their paper is to identify observables that are provably value indefinite, which could then be used as certifiable quantum random-number generators.
Remark 2: The KS theorem applies at the level of QM observables. Its extension to the level of ontic states is not automatic.
However, the extension is not difficult. Suppose that the response function for the measurement of M i , ξ(M i |λ), is outcome deterministic. Then, for each ontic state λ, it will provide a valuation of the observables {M i } of the kind contemplated in the K-S theorem. But for Hilbert spaces of dimension 3 (or higher), no such valuation is possible. As a consequence of this fact, there are two possibilities. The first is that the response function be outcome indeterministic. It then yields only a probability for the measurement outcome, and so does not yield a (self-contradictory) valuation on the set of observables. The second is that the response function be measurement contextual. This means that ξ(M i |λ, S M ) depends on the measurement context S M , as well as on the particular observable M i that is being measured. This result is worth stating as a theorem, which I shall call the "KS-OM Theorem" (KS theorem extended to Ontological Models):
KS-OM Theorem: For a quantum system of Hilbert-space dimension 3 or greater, any underlying ontological model must be outcome indeterministic OR measurement contextual.
Notice that these two options for ontological models closely parallel the two options at the QM observable level, PI 1 and PI 2, that were paraphrased from [10] .
But the necessary arguments in [10] were very subtle and complex, whereas the derivation of the KS-OM theorem was very simple. This confirms, once again, the utility of the ontological model as a method of investigation.
Let us now return to the second implication of the theorem (18), which by logical contraposition becomes K-S contextual ⇒ NOT Maximally ψ-epistemic. The authors did not distinguish between the KS theorem and the KS-OM theorem (naturally enough, since the latter had not yet been formalized), and so the exact meaning of their implication above is not quite clear. Their definition of "the Kochen-Specker theorem" in [3] does not reflect the conditions of the original KS theorem; however, it is very close to those of the KS-OM theorem. From its context, their term "K-S contextual" seems to mean the second option of the KS-OM theorem. However, a stronger statement is possible.
Both options of the KS-OM theorem imply that Maximally ψ-epistemic models are excluded.
From (14), it is evident that the first option, outcome indeterminacy, excludes Maximally ψ-epistemic models. Immediately following (13) was stated a Corollary, to the effect that a Maximally ψ-epistemic model must be measurement noncontextual. So the second option of the KS-OM theorem also excludes Maximally ψ-epistemic models.
This was actually proven in [3] (their Theorem 1 ), and any confusion is due only to the ambiguity of the term "KS contextual".
V. Ψ-ONTIC-COMPLETE
Colbeck and Renner [7] have presented a theorem, from which they conclude that "A system's wave function is in one-to-one correspondence with its elements of reality." Their argument is based on the conclusion of an earlier paper [8] , in which they claimed that "No extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power." In the context of ontological models, their claims are equivalent to excluding all models except ψ-ontic-complete.
The audacity of their claims invites skepticism. Although their papers are heavily formal, the authors are very helpful in pointing out that their conclusions depend on a certain assumption relating to Freedom of Choice. They point out that several counter-examples to their claims violate that assumption.
Colbeck and Renner represent free choice as a random variable that is uncorrelated with anything in its past light-cone. The unsatisfactory nature of that characterization is apparent. For example, democratic elections are based on the secret ballot, the purpose of which is to ensure that the voters may excersize free choice. The voting patterns of most voters are strongly correlated with past events. Many people vote consistently for the same party, but they may depart from that pattern for any of several reasons: recent performance of their old party in government, personal characteristics of particular candidates, self-interest, etc. But those correlations with events in the past light-cone notwithstanding, they are still excersizing free choice! The characterization of free choice that Colbeck and Renner use is unrealistic and unsatisfactory. Since, by their own admission, their results depend critically on that assumption, it follows that their radical claims are null and void.
Ghirardi and Romano [11] , in opposition to the claim of [8] , have shown how to construct an ontological model whose predictive power is different, and possibly greater, than that of quantum theory. The essence of their model is to separate the ontic state λ into two parts (ν, τ ), where ν is inaccessible and must be averaged over, but τ is accessible. LetÂ(a) denote a quantum mechanical observable that depends on the parameter a. (A component of spin,Â(a) = σ · a, is an example.) The average of this observable can be calculated in two steps. First average over the inaccessible ontic variable ν, to obtain the conditional average, Â (a) ψ,τ . Then average over the accessible variable τ to obtain the usual quantum state average, Â (a) ψ = ψ|Â(a)|ψ . The model can be constructed so that the conditional average Â (a) ψ,τ is more informative than is the quantum state average. Many thought experiments (such as that in Bell's theorem) treat the selection of the observable to be measured as a free choice by the experimenter. In [11] free choice is represented by allowing the parameter a inÂ(a) to be arbitrary, and then proving the desired results for all values of a. Thus the manner in which the experimenter chooses a is irrelevant. This method is more satisfactory than to speculate about the random or nonrandom nature of free will [12] .
The interpretation of QM in which "A system's wave function is in one-to-one correspondence with its elements of reality" has been criticized, and usually rejected, because of Schrödinger's Cat Paradox (1935). It follows from that interpretation, that the cat possesses neither the attribute of being alive nor the attribute of being dead. If that conclusion is rejected on observational grounds, then the ontological model ψ-complete will not lead to a satisfactory interpretation of quantum theory. However, ψ-epistemic models and ψ-ontic-supplemented models remain as viable candidates. In all of those models, the cat may be either alive or dead, but the quantum state does not provide us with the information as to which is the case.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The broadest consequence of introducing ontological models into the foundations of QM, is a sharpening of the discussions. A woefully common feature, in the past, was that each protagonist had some interpretation of the quantum state in mind, but never stated clearly what it was, and so might shift between ontic and epistemic interpretations whenever he found it convenient. The introduction of ontological models has made people aware of the distinction between ontic and epistemic.
But beyond this raising of awareness, it has provided a mathematical framework, within which various possibilities can be evaluated. Ontic and epistemic models were distinguished by the overlap of the epistemic states (distributions of ontic states) that are associated with the preparations of different quantum states. This overlap varies from zero for ψ-ontic models, through various degrees of overlap for ψ-epistemic models, to the limit of maximally ψ-epistemic.
It came as a surprize when Maroney's theorem [2] demonstrated that maximally ψ-epistemic models are not possible for Hilbert spaces of more than 2 dimensions. Indeed, some people concluded (prematurely) that epistemic interpretations of quantum states had been ruled out. However, it was shown earlier in this paper that maximally ψ-epistemic is logically equivalent to the conjunction of preparation-measurement-reciprocity AND outcome-determinism. Thus any model (ψ-epistemic or ψ-ontic) can fail to be maximally ψ-epistemic in only two ways: either through nonreciprocity or by indeterminism. It had been hoped that the inability to distinguish non-orthogonal quantum states with certainty might be explained through the overlap of the corresponding ontic state distributions. That proved to be impossible, but measurement-outcome indeterminism can also account for non-distinguishability of non-orthogonal quantum states, and this works for both ψ-epistemic and ψ-ontic models.
An ontological model has two essential parts: the distribution µ(λ|ψ, S P ) that characterizes quantum state preparation, and the response function ξ(M i |λ, S M ) that characterizes measurement. The most important structure of the model is the separation of preparation from measurement, with information passing only via the ontic state variables. If the state ψ has a direct effect on the measurement outcome, then ψ should be classified as an ontic variable. The definition in [1] of ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic in terms of the overlap between the distributions of ontic states, deals only with preparation, and does not deal with the passing of information to the measurement. Therefore, I shall introduce a new definition for this purpose.
Def ine a model to be functionally ψ-epistemic if the measurement response function ξ(M i |λ, S M ) does not depend on the state ψ. Otherwise, if the response function ξ(M i |ψ, λ, S M ) depends essentially on ψ, the model is functionally ψ-ontic.
The Kochen-Specker model (Ex. 2 in App. A) is an example of a functionally ψ-epistemic model, but it is restricted to Hilbert spaces of 2 dimensions.
Under the old definition in [1] , we could convert a ψ-epistemic model into a ψ-ontic-supplemented model by declaring -verbally -that ψ is to be considered ontic. That would be quite artificial, but it is allowed by that definition. The new definition of functionally ψ-epistemic does not allow such a loophole.
I claim that the essential feature of an epistemic interpretation of quantum states is better captured by the concept of functionally ψ-epistemic than by the definition of ψ-epistemic in [1] . The nonexistence of maximally ψ-epistemic models (for d ≥ 3) does not rule out epistemic interpretations. However, if functionally ψ-epistemic models should turn out to be excluded, then epistemic interpretations would, indeed, be excluded with them.
Appendix A -Some Ontological Models
Some examples of Ontological Models are described in Table I . The last 3 columns indicate whether the model has the attributes of Preparation-measurementreciprocity, Outcome-determinism, and Measurementcontextuality. Recall that all models satisfy (Eq. 4), Λ ψ ⊆ Core(ξ(ψ|λ)) ⊆ Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)), and that Reciprocity means Λ ψ = Core(ξ(ψ|λ)), and Determinism means Core(ξ(ψ|λ)) = Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)). Notice that, of the properties in the last 3 columns, not all combinations of yes and no are represented. Since reciprocity AND determinism imply that the model is maximally ψ-epistemic (14), and the Corollary of (13) requires maximally ψ-epistemic to be measurementnoncontextual, it follows that the combination yes-yesyes is impossible. It remains to be determined whether models exhibiting no-no-yes and no-no-no are possible. It would be particularly interesting to exhibit a measurement-noncontextual model for d > 2, since the KS-OM theorem seems to permit it, provided the model is outcome indeterministic. Models 1-6 in Table I are discussed in detail in [5] , and in those cases where I have nothing to add, I shall merely refer to that paper. For original references, see [5] .
Beltrametti-Bugajski model:
This model is really just ordinary QM, written in the language of ontological models. The ontic state space Λ is the projective Hilbert space of quantum states, and µ(λ|ψ) dλ = δ(λ − ψ) dλ. The response function for a projective measurement of |ψ ψ| is ξ(ψ|λ) = | λ|ψ | 2 . The core-support of ξ(ψ|λ) is the single point λ = ψ, whereas its full support consists of Λ minus the set of measure zero for which λ|ψ = 0. Thus the model satisfies Λ ψ = Core(ξ(ψ|λ)) ⊂ Supp(ξ(ψ|λ)), showing that it satisfies preparation-measurement-reciprocity, but is "deficient." 2. Kochen-Specker model: See [5] for details. The K-S model for a spin-1 2 system exhibits everything that is "nice" in ontological models: reciprocity, maximally ψ-epistemic, functionally ψ-epistemic, outcomedeterministic, and measurement-noncontextual. It also provides a simple example of preparation-contextuality. Unfortunately, there are fundamental reasons why this combination of nice features cannot all be realized for higher dimensional Hilbert spaces.
Aaronson's model:
See [5] for details. This model is similar to Model 1, but it adds a privileged basis, and so becomes ψ-supplemented. It was invented for computation-theoretic purposes. [5] for details. As in Model 1, the ontic state of the system is identical with its quantum state. But there are hidden ontic variables in the measurement apparatus. If their values were known, the measurement would be outcome deterministic. But since they are unknown, they must be averaged over, leading to an effective outcome indeterministic response function.
Wiener-Siegel model:
This model is treated in detail by Belinfante [13] , (the main point is on p.135). The ontic variables are the state vector |ψ and another vector |λ . The latter is unnormalized, and has a Gaussian distribution over Hilbert space. Let B = {|j } N j=1 be a basis for a projective measurement. Introduce a j = j|ψ and b j = j|λ . Then the response function is defined to be ξ(i|ψ, λ, B) = 1 if the ratio |a i /b i | is the largest of the set {|a j /b j |}, and is zero otherwise. The model is outcome deterministic, and so must violate reciprocity (since it cannot be maximally ψ-epistemic). That it is measurement contextual can be seen by keeping the basis vector |i fixed and doing a unitary transformation on the remaining set {|j } for j = i. This transformation can change the identity of the largest of the ratios {|a j /b j |}.
Appendix B -Interpretations of the Quantum State
There is a tendancy to say that the quantum state is either physical real or it represents knowledge. In fact the range of options is much greater. The three dichotomies shown in the rows of Fig. 2 : individual versus ensemble, ontic versus epistemic, and objective versus subjective, are not equivalent. A specific interpretation will involve The classes of ontic and epistemic are central to this subject, but the meanings of those terms are not quite the same as those in a dictionary. In the commonly used definitions of [1] , the class ψ-epistemic includes everything not included in ψ-ontic. That being so, we must broaden the meaning of epistemic from its dictionary meaning, pertaining to knowledge, to include information in general. Since the fundamental work of Shannon, it has been clear that information need not be subjective. In his theory, a string of bits has the same information content, regardless of whether it is part of anyone's knowledge, and regardless of whether it contains a humanly interesting message. Therefore, I have been careful to describe epistemic interpretations of ψ as carrying information about the system, rather than knowledge. The word knowledge begs the question of Whose knowledge?, whereas the word information does not.
Moving to the top row of Fig. 2 , one can naturaly regard an ensemble interpretation as epistemic. The quantum state does not predict events, but only the probabilities of events. Hence it provides information about the system, but does not completely describe it. But the case of ψ-ontic-supplemented also yields an ensemble description, so an ensemble interpretation can be either epistemic or ontic.
Similarly, an individual interpretation can be naturally regarded as ontic, but it is at least logically possible for ψ to give information about the individual, without itself being an ontic element of reality. I do not know of an actual example of such an interpretation, so I will give an analogy. In classical thermodynamics the variables P,V,U,S, and T are regarded as onticly real properties of the individual system. The partition function of statistical mechanics is not regarded as ontic, but it can be used to calculate those ontic properties. It seems logically possible for ψ to relate to the individual quantum system, in the same way that the partition function relates to the individual thermodynamic system.
On the bottom row of Fig. 2 , it is clear that a subjective interpretation must be epistemic. But an epistemic interpretation may be either objective or subjective, depending on whether the information that its provides is objective (independent of any agent) or subjective (knowledge possessed by some particular agent).
